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In late 2004, the concept of the creative industries arrived in China. It was warmly 
welcomed in Shanghai then subsequently adopted with some degree of caution in 
Beijing. In the years since, officials, scholars, practitioners, entrepreneurs and 
developers have exploited of the idea of creative industries, and a range of associated 
terms, to construct an alternative vision of an emerging China. In 2009, Li Wuwei, the 
Director of the Shanghai Creative Industries Association, himself a leading player in 
national political reform, released a book titled Creativity is Changing China 
(Chuangyi gaibian Zhongguo), subsequently translated as Creative Industries Are 
Changing China in English. 
 
The paper investigates the uptake of the creative industries in China and asks: can 
they really change China, or are they just rearranging the cultural landscape in some 
cities?  
 




Creative industries in China: four perspectives on transformation 
 
The creative industries are those industries that are based on individual 
creativity, skill and talent. They are also those that have the potential to create 
wealth and jobs through developing intellectual property (DCMS 1998).  
Creative industries are those industries that rely upon creative ideas, skill and 
advanced technology as core elements, increase value in production and 
consumption and create wealth and provide extensive jobs for the society 





The creative industries came to mainland China in late 2004. With its UK credentials 
apparent to all, this nouveau arrivé in the development stakes was championed by 
Professor Li Wuwei, an economist within the Shanghai Academy of Social Sciences. 
As China’s business powerhouse, Shanghai maintains a closer association with 
developments in the southern metropolis of Hong Kong than Beijing. The year prior 
to Shanghai’s reception of creative industries the Creative Industries Baseline Study 
had been published by the University of Hong Kong Cultural Policy Unit (CCPR 
2003). This influential document largely facilitated an emerging discourse of cultural 
development in China, including the term chuangyi chanye, which would become the 
popular translation for creative industries.  
 
In time the Shanghai Academy of Social Sciences would become a focal point for 
definitional clarity in respect to creative industries in China. However, despite a 
palpable sense of anticipation in 2004-5, the creative industries ‘believers’ were in a  
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 minority; they had to convince a political community in the nation’s capital, the 
incumbent power brokers within the central Ministry of Culture (MoC). For 
conservatives the creative industries was simply a ‘cargo cult’, a Trojan Horse; it was 
incompatible, alien and suspicious; furthermore it had not made its way through 
Chinese Communist Party work groups, the complicated system that adjudicates on 
sensitive policy reform. In effect, its appeal to city planners, officials and 
entrepreneurs had short-circuited this process.  
 
In 2004, about the time that the creative industries idea was gaining momentum in 
Shanghai, the American scholar Jing Wang was expressing reservations about its 
acceptance in a system guided by central planning, particularly when the ‘cultural 
industries’ were designated state policy. She writes, ‘The thorniest question triggered 
by the paradigm of creative industries is that of ‘creativity’—the least problematic in 
the western context. How do we begin to envision a parallel discussion in a country 
where creative imagination is subjugated to active state surveillance?’ (Wang 2004: 
13). Indeed, if the creative industries are bringing about change, as one of the 
perspectives in this paper suggests, might it be a case of the ‘economic tail wagging 
the cultural dog’? Is competition for profit within China’s expanding media 
production sector, increasingly organised into independents and increasingly regional, 
lessening the ideological straightjacket that has conspired to subjugate creative 
imagination? Is the need to attract tourists and consumers to China’s urban art 
districts allowing greater risk-taking and tolerance?    
 
In this paper I examine the dissemination of the creative industries in China. I do this 
by offering four propositions that provide a forecast of its longevity.  These are 
1. The creative industries idea, and that of creativity itself, is not native to China. 
While currently fashionable creative industries policy has no real capacity to 
effect any substantial change; i.e. the more things change the more they stay 
the same; 
2. The creative industries are fundamentally misunderstood in China and are 
more appropriately construed as cultural industries; because cultural 
traditionalism exerts so much influence in policy making the creative 
industries offer little hope of change;  
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 3. The creative industries are here to stay in China although they will always be 
managed by party officials, thus negating the positive externalities associated 
with artistic freedoms in the West; 
4. The creative industries are changing China; the change is institutional, 
fundamental, and is occurring along geographical divides; 
 
 
Creativity: essentially a Western idea? 
 
Due to creativity’s Western legacy, creative industries policy will have no real 
capacity to effect any substantial change.  
 
 
A conventional view of China is that it resists change. For instance, research into 
business management practices in China reveal deep-seated value systems that defy 
foreign ideas, and in turn generate a production line of ‘how to think like Chinese’ 
manuals (Zhang and Baker 2008). However, the discourse of resistance to change is 
one that we need to constantly interrogate: while it is often noted, much resistance to 
the outside is expressed through elite political channels. As Frank Dikötter writes, ‘a 
refusal to engage with the presence of the modern has been one way to preserve the 
fiction of a more ‘authentic’ China to be discovered by romantic traveller and 
historian alike’ (Dikötter 2004: 4). Throughout history, with the exception of the 
revolutionary period from 1949 to 1978, China has absorbed foreign ideas. It has 
managed to integrate these ideas into its social fabric, albeit while still retaining a 
cultural identity. In effect, with the acceleration of information technologies in the 
past two decades we now observe a more contested field of ideas—between slogan-
heavy political versions of progress and the more flexible and adaptable concerns of 
business, creative practitioners and communities.  
 
In the early 1990s, China’s architect of economic reform, Deng Xiaoping, coined the 
phrase ‘commodity economy with Chinese characteristics’. This celebrated 
announcement gave birth to a long list of articles, policy statements and conference 
papers concerning China’s ‘pragmatic’ adaptation of foreign ideas. In many cases 
selective modification of foreign concepts was a matter of expediency; it entailed an 
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 element of forgetting—in particular forgetting about the bogey of ‘bourgeois 
liberalism’, a term that had motivated Chinese Communist Party rhetoric against 
capitalism for most of the revolutionary period (1949-1978), and even throughout the 
1980s. The catchphrase ‘with Chinese characteristics’ soon became Newspeak for 
how China would integrate on its own terms, and according to appropriate political 
authentication.  
 
Another term, yu guoji jiegui, appeared in popular use around the same time. Jiegui 
literally means to connect with a train track—the full phrase implies the trajectory of 
bringing China in line with the rest of the world (guoji). In December 2001, China 
formally connected to the world economy. It joined the World Trade Organisation. In 
the lead up to this event, a senior government official chose the metaphor of a 
‘wrecking ball’, suggesting that integration would smash old institutional practices 
and allow the marketplace to rebuild with greater capacity (Jin 2002). This coded 
reference to Schumpeter’s ‘gales of creative destruction’ in an address to the World 
Bank on October 22, 2002 by China’s Vice-Minister of Finance Jin Liqun might have 
been construed by some members of the international community as evidence of a 
new willingness to accommodate widespread institutional reforms 
 
From a Ministry of Culture—as well as a Central Propaganda Department 
perspective—few forces could be as potentially destructive to China’s political 
sovereignty as creativity. Its association with capitalism were writ clear. At the time 
of accession, moreover, the media industries — and culture more broadly—were 
quarantined (Keane 2002). Indeed, culture had assumed the high ground of national 
sovereignty. China would invest in its culture, not just for economic reasons, but as a 
way of resisting what many conservatives felt would be the inevitable inroads of 
Western movies, television and advertising.   
 
In the past few years the Chinese leadership has carefully moved its mode of 
governance into a more ‘harmonious’ space, emphasising an enlightened attitude 
towards economic and social development as well as international relations. The 
concept of ‘soft power’ (ruan shili) has assumed the status of international 
propaganda as China attempts to reach out to the world with its own ideas. To 
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 dissociate completely with creative industries would refute the new openness to ideas 
and derail China’s connecting (jiegui).  
 
 
Scholars have generally agreed that the concept of creativity, at least as it is applied in 
the UK creative industries bible, is Western. The question we need to therefore 
consider is: is there a disjuncture between the Western idea of creativity and Chinese 
tradition? Indeed, these are debates that have exercised the minds of thinkers in the 
past. For instance, Hegel believed that ‘the Orient’ never experienced a rupture with 
nature, such as had occurred in Greek tradition, which ultimately led to discontinuity, 
together with a propensity to separate nature and culture (Hegel 1975; cited in Puett 
2001; see also Makeham 2004). On the other hand, Voltaire (1828) argued that 
continuity between nature and culture—as expressed in Chinese cultural artefacts and 
writings—had allowed China a period of early advancement, which was followed by 
stasis. This argument about stasis, which is elaborated in the work of modern 
economists such as Landes (2006) and Mokyr (2002), is supported by documentary 
evidence from pre-classical China. In the period of the Zhou Dynasty referred to as 
‘the Hundred Schools of Thought’, usually associated with Confucius and his 
followers, debates ensued as to whether the ‘superior man’ ought to innovate. Despite 
evidence that suggests that one school, the Mohists, promoted a link between culture 
and the creation of artefacts, the dominant Confucian view was that people should 
eschew innovation and model themselves on the patterns that came from nature.i  
 
Following this historical argument to its expression in contemporary society one 
would expect the discourse of creativity and inter alia creative industries to have little 
impact. Conversely, there are many scholars, critics, lobbyists, and educators in China 
who point to the historical legacy of eschewing innovation and who see the 
international ‘super-sign’ of creativity as a means of breaking down ‘the patterns of 
the past’ (Wu 2006; Liu Shifa 2004; Li 2004; Hu 2002; for super-sign see Lydia Liu 
2004). However, many who recognize the limits of ‘patterning’ find little comfort in 
the shock of the new. As de Muynck (2007) writes, ‘cut and paste creativity’, the 
practice of expediently adding the description ‘creative’ (chuangyi) to clusters, zones, 
precincts, bases, corridors, parks, shopping malls, real estate developments, and theme 
parks has little to say about engendering creative design principles. The practice of 
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 imitating successful patterns by adding a ‘creative’ façade is often an exercise in 
superficiality. In short, the more things change, the more they stay the same.  
 
 
Here come the creative industries: circle the wagons! 
 
The creative industries are fundamentally misunderstood in China and are more 
appropriately construed as cultural industries; because cultural traditionalism exerts 
so much influence in policy making the creative industries offer little hope of change.  
 
Differences, as well as the similarities between cultural and creative industries in 
China, are split along national and regional fault lines. A broad perspective locates 
Ministry of Culture policy makers in Beijing, who stridently oppose the creative 
industries concept, and what McGee et al (2007) call ‘growth coalitions’. These 
municipal and provincial coalitions include local governments, developers and 
investors, research agencies, and entrepreneurs. As I have argued elsewhere, for these 
agents the creative industries are a development template into which local 
characteristics are inscribed (Keane 2009).  
 
In the West protracted debates have ensued for several years about the 
appropriateness of terminology, cultural vs. creative. Similar debates have taken place 
in China. While I don’t wish to engage with the international quarrels here it is clear 
that ‘neo-liberal’ elements of creative industries policy have been at the centre of 
most critiques. As Yúdice (2003: 82) writes, neo-liberalism refers to ‘the set of 
policies that include trade liberalisation, privatization, the reduction (and, in some 
cases, near elimination) of state-subsidized socials services like health care and 
education, the lowering of wages and the evisceration of labour rights …’. Yúdice 
demonstrates convincingly that the turn to the creative economy, notably the 
gentrification of urban space, privileges the professional-managerial classes, increases 
rents, while positioning subordinate groups as service providers or ‘providers of “life-
giving” ethnic and other cultural experiences’ (Yudice 2003: 20; see also Rossiter 
2006; Ross 2005, 2009).   
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 In China, ideological positions are arraigned somewhat differently. The fact that the 
creative industries might be redolent of neo-liberalism seems to less of an issue than 
their perceived absence of politics. An influential article by a Ministry of Culture 
spokesperson published in the Blue Book of Chinese Culture in 2007 argued that 
whereas the Chinese cultural industries integrated economics and ideology, the UK 
creative industries were lacking ideology. As evidence, the writer Wang Yongzhang 
cited the fact that the core creative industries in the UK included industrial design, 
which in his view ‘had no ideological character’. In contrast, the national list of core 
cultural industries in China includes journalism, publishing, audio-visual and 
electronic publishing, radio, television, movies, performing arts, cultural exhibitions, 
cultural relics, museums, libraries, archives, mass cultural activities, cultural research, 
and community cultural organization. All have ideological components and are 
managed by the state in some respect. This critique of ideological deficiency appears 
to be provisional, however, if we take into account another widespread criticism by 
Ministry of Culture conservatives, namely that the creative industries are about 
individual endeavour, in contrast to the cultural industries which are ‘of the people’.  
 
Aside from their Western origins, it is not difficult to understand why the creative 
industries provoked antipathy among Ministry of Culture and Party faithful. At the 
time that the UK’s Department of Culture Media and Sport (DCMS) was unveiling its 
Creative Industries Task Force in 1998, the Chinese Ministry of Culture was 
addressing the vexed problem of stimulating the cultural market in China. The master 
plan was to promote the ‘cultural industries’ (wenhua chanye). However, it wasn’t 
until the Fifth Session of the Fifteenth Party Congress in October 2000 that the 
cultural industries were introduced as part of the ‘recommendations’ for the national 
Tenth Five Year Plan.ii In March 2001, these were subsequently ratified in the Fourth 
Session of the Ninth People’s Congress (Zhang et al 2004). However, it took three 
more years before the National Statistical Office (guojia tongji ju) was able to 
identify industrial sectors in a way that corresponded to the data sets that were 
emerging globally (Wang 2007).iii   
 
In the interim period, the policy concepts of ‘innovative nation’ (chuangxin guojia) 
and ‘autonomous innovation’ (zizhu chuangxin) were fermenting in Chinese policy 
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 think tanks. Innovation was first and foremost about promoting scientific progress, 
exemplified by China’s sending its first man into space in 2003. By now associated 
with industrialisation, culture was brought into a planned marriage with innovation, 
even if the mode of engagement remained unclear. But the big picture was clearly 
defined. China needed to resolve its dependence on the West; and accordingly it 
would do so by two means. First, global technology outsourcing combined with local 
knowledge and cost advantage would effect an initial wave of innovation; following 
this, China would use the technology and know-how to create large enterprises that 
would harness intellectual property and become global brands (Liu 2005). While these 
catch-up prescriptions pertained directly to technology and manufacturing sectors, 
they were soon embedded in the rhetoric of ‘cultural development’ (wenhua jianshe)iv 
(Wang 2007: 41).  
 
The term ‘innovation’ carries a certain flavour of expediency, and this is no more so 
than in the People’s Republic of China. Steve Fuller calls it ‘the first global policy 
craze of the 21st century’ (2007: 103). He notes that the tightness of fit between 
innovation and capitalism in turn reflects a desire to turn non-capital into capital. 
Indeed, the flavour of the creative industries, particularly as articulated within the 
DCMS Task Force format reinforces the goal of making underperforming and non-
capital cultural assets more accountable and already performing enterprises more 
successful. For this to occur, however, there needs to be an ecology that supports the 
origination and dissemination of ideas. However, an ecology that allows powerful 
interests to dominate, whether these are transnational corporations or state 
conglomerates, is unlikely to produce real innovation.     
 
In this respect, the link between cultural development (wenhua jianshe), innovation 
(chuangxin) and creativity (chuangyi) remains an unresolved policy issue. In linking 
the first two of these elements Wang Yongzhang notes the dual nature of China’s 
cultural industries, that fact that they are both public institutions (shiye) and industries 
(chanye) (See Zhang 2006). The key point here is that the gradual transition from the 
former state-owned and managed institution model to the more autonomous industry 
model is a process guided by enlightened officials who have the best interests of the 
population at heart. For some state-owned companies, however, the shift to becoming 
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 entrepreneurial is not so easy; it means adopting changes in management style and 
accepting risk.v  
 
In addition to demonstrating the fit between guided development and markets, The 
MoC official Mr. Wang points to the fact that the emphasis on wealth creation and 
employment in the DCMS is different from China’s core intention ‘to cultivate 
autonomous innovation capacity’, which he says entails producing famous brands and 
nurturing competitive cultural enterprises, as well as enterprise groups that generate 
their own intellectual property. In this reading, the Chinese government should avoid 
international trends and maintain its right to define ‘soft power’ (ruan shili) in terms 
that reflect national sovereignty. 
 
In retrospect Jing Wang was undoubtedly correct in her assessment of the hegemony 
of cultural industries and its political differentiation from the new foreign interloper. 
This was a Trojan Horse in more ways than one. The discourse of creativity conspired 
to usher in a Western model of individuals, autonomous artists, entrepreneurs and 
iconoclasts: ‘The creative industries are those industries that are based on individual 
creativity, skill and talent’.  
 
Central to the popularisation of the creative industries discourse in China are growth 
coalitions who court the favours of propaganda officials. As mentioned earlier these 
are often loose alignments of interests, some focused on turning a profit, others more 
concerned with keeping up with international trends. In this collusion of networks, 
municipal, city and district governments were opting to choose their development 
paths. The Beijing Municipal Government decided to split first, settling for the hybrid 
term Cultural and Creative Industries (CCI). In 2006, the Beijing Municipal 
Government established an annual event, the International Cultural and Creative 
Industries Expo (ICCIE), which was heavily inclined towards establishing business 
relationships, highlighted by the ceremonial signing of contracts and the bestowal of 
gold plaques for clustering excellence. As I have discussed elsewhere (Keane 2007) 
this foot-in-both-camps strategy allowed more entrepreneurs to join the fold and it 
facilitated the inclusion of so-called non-ideological sectors such as design, which 
were fast-growing sectors in the light of Beijing’s hosting of the Olympic Games. 
Another research ‘school’ in Beijing chose to drop ‘cultural’ and concentrate on 
 10
 creative industries. The Development Report of Creative Industry in China 
subsequently emerged from the Beijing Academy of Science and Technology.  
 
In a sense, these developments were following the lead of Shanghai, which instituted 
its annual Creative Industry Week in 2005. Indeed, the article by the Ministry of 
Culture official illustrates how local officials and developers were beginning to 
operate. The official is critical of the trendiness of the term ‘creativity’. He accuses 
city, municipal and district governments of ignorance. In doing so, he cites one media 
report from the city of Nanjing in Jiangsu Province, which reads, ‘we should 
energetically develop creative industries with a focus on cultural construction and we 
should prioritize cultural industries as those industries we should support’ (p. 44). He 
asks: ‘does this article emphasize cultural or creative industries?’ In effect, as much as 
misunderstanding, this kind of report reflects the desire of local officials and 
entrepreneurs to identify with whatever idea is fashionable. 
 
Another important factor that has bearing on how the creative (and/or cultural) 
industries are defined, categorized, and accounted for is tradition. I referred to this in 
passing in the previous section, noting that ‘the more things change the more they stay 
the same’. From a national perspective China’s tradition is its prime cultural resource. 
It is important to understand therefore just how important tradition is to Chinese 
people and inter alia how government is cognisant of its economic potential. In this 
respect, it is interesting to note that cultural tourism, including the manufacture and 
sale of souvenirs, figures heavily in the data purporting to show China as a dominant 
force in the global creative economy (UNCTAD 2008). While the heritage economy 
is understandably associated with cultural industries data, the Development Report on 
the Creative Industry in China 2007, lists tourism services under recreational 
services.vi Tourism revenue has become essential to ensuring China’s cultural and 
creative industries are world competitive.  
 
The centrality of tradition is by no means universally accepted. Speaking of the need 
to incorporate creative planning into the 2010 Shanghai Expo, Yu Qiuyu, a well 
known artist argued that it is necessary, ‘to avoid getting carried away by tradition 
because the objective of the World Expo is to demonstrate the newest things in the 
world’ (Yu 2008: 10). He also made the point that a Shanghai Expo without some 
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The pragmatism of creative industries 
 
The creative industries are here to stay in China although they will always be 
managed by party officials, thus negating the positive externalities associated with 
artistic freedoms in the West. 
 
In 2008, UNCTAD’s Creative Economy report made headlines in China. Drawing on 
a longitudinal study of cultural exports conducted by researchers associated with 
UNESCO, the report concluded that China’s ‘creative economy’ was in very good 
shape, even despite much soul-searching the previous year within China about its 
‘cultural export deficit (Keane 2007). UNCTAD’s methodology and definitions of the 
creative economy ranked China third to the UK and the US in cultural export rankings. 
Indeed, the arrival of the Creative Economy Report was fortuitous for many Chinese 
intellectuals and researchers who had championed the creative industries but who felt 
they needed to include heritage and associated manufacturing activities if only to 
prove that Chinese creative industries had comparable scale to the cultural industries. 
The United Nations was soon regaled as a friend of China’s cultural planners, 
notwithstanding much published problems of data coherence.  
 
Proposition three is built on the assumption that the suspicious Trojan Horse sighted 
by officials has by now transformed into a Chinese phoenix.  In Chinese mythology 
the phoenix symbolized high virtue and prosperity. More importantly, it represents 
rebirth; it is a composite of several bird species: for instance, it has the head of a 
pheasant, the beak of a parrot, body of a mandarin duck, wings of the roe, plumage of 
a peacock and legs of the crane (Zhang and Bu 2007). The creative industries had 
metamorphosed; they had taken on a hybrid character. From one perspective they 
were traditional, political and slow moving, highly centred on tourism and 
manufacturing; from another perspective they aspired to be ‘more free’ of politics, to 
‘take off’ into the new media age.   
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 Despite this heady aspiration to fly, creative freedom is the essential ingredient that is 
difficult to discuss in China. Creative clusters require ‘creative space’: this can be 
workshops and studios, as well as market space. But it also implies a creative mental 
and entrepreneurial space, a willingness to experiment with new ideas, competitive 
cooperation across networks of businesses, and fast learning and adoption of 
successful ideas. O’Connor and Gu (2006) have raised the question as to whether 
China can have creativity and innovation without social, cultural and political change. 
Will the creative industries deliver greater tolerance, as suggested by its Western 
provenance, or will it play directly into the hands of conservative officials?  
 
Without doubt, creativity is compromised in China due to official management. The 
problem of politics interfering into the realm of expression is the institutional 
roadblock that Jing Wang referred to in 2004, and which has been the focus of 
numerous studies of China’s cultural sphere (see Goldmann 1967; Kraus 2004). 
Significantly, however, it is the economic bottom line that increasingly dictates the 
nature of activities undertaken. Some places provide outlets for rock music, hip hop 
and digital art festivals. For many, being able to locate in art district or creative cluster 
brings them closer to the ideal consumer, often the international tourist or collector.  
The key problem with this model, however, is that officials are prone to risk aversion, 
and emanating from this they are inclined to support projects that will further their 
careers. Nevertheless, more tolerance is evident. In 2007, officials at Songzhuang Art 
District outside Beijing allowed the screening of a Queer Film Festival while also 
condoning exhibition of visual art expressing unconventional political views 
(Ulfstjerne 2008).  
 
The expansion of venues has contributed to the exchange of ideas between local and 
international artists. The propaganda officials who manage creative clusters and 
cultural zones are now seeing the opportunities first hand. China may not be able to 
develop the same kinds of creative expression as the West. However, increased 
awareness of the benefits of ‘freer expression’ can be illustrated by the example of 
Beijing’s Nanluo guxiang hutong in Dongcheng District. This is a traditional alleyway 
(hutong) area where young film makers, musicians, artists and designers freely mix 
with international visitors in cafes and bars. Local propaganda officials have adopted 
a tolerant attitude. Realising that this milieu has spontaneously emerged, they are 
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 mindful of the fate of the 798 Art Zone in nearby Chaoyang District, which some 
suggest has been over-commercialised and over-managed by zealous officials, 
resulting in negative attitudes among artists towards the development. In order to 
avoid the 798 effect the enlightened managers of Nanluo guxiang have so far resisted 





Creative industries are changing China 
 
The creative industries are changing China; the change is institutional, fundamental, 
and is occurring along geographical divides. 
 
‘They eat the meat and we have the bone; they eat the rice and we have the husk’. 
Li Wuwei, Creative Industries are Changing China.  
 
 
In late 2008, Xinhua Publishing released Li Wuwei’s book called Creative Industries 
are Changing China.  Li is an extremely influential actor in the current debates about 
whether cultural or creative industries are the best road forward for China. As 
mentioned in the introduction the idea of creative industries came into China via 
Shanghai. Li is Vice-chairman of the National Committee of the Chinese People's 
Political Consultative Conference as well as Vice-chairman of the Central Committee 
of the Chinese Guomindang Revolutionary Committee. In a more specialist sense, he 
is an economist and is the Director of the Shanghai Creative Industries Association 
(SCIA) and the Director of the Research Centre for Creative Industries within the 
Shanghai Academy of Social Sciences. 
 
In criticizing China’s reliance on Made in China, the economic dominance of Chinese 
factories, Li says it is time to change China’s development model. He calls these 
‘sweat industries’, and he criticises the fact that the profits usually go overseas.  
Li’s work is in keeping with the ‘harmonious society’ and ‘soft power’ rhetoric of the 
Chinese government. He positions his arguments strategically, aware that his 
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 organization, the Shanghai Academy of Social Sciences, stands exposed as a mediator 
of the Western idea of the ‘creative industries’; the task is therefore to negate some of 
the problematic foreign elements while taking on board what is useful and progressive 
for China. Echoing the views of Wang Yongzhang, the Ministry of Culture 
spokesperson cited above, Li contends there is considerable overlap between cultural 
and creative industries. Rather than attempting to construct an either-or standoff, Li is 
conciliatory. He says that whereas cultural industries emphasize the industrialization 
of culture, creative industries stress creative capacity and place more emphasis on 
their contribution to the economy. Li also brings innovation into the frame in a more 
sophisticated way than Wang. As I have mentioned, the MoC view is articulated 
through the government slogans ‘autonomous innovation’, ‘innovative nation’ and 
‘cultural development’. In attempting to build a more robust argument for creativity, 
Li disaggregates it into (scientific) innovation and cultural creativity. He argues that 
innovation results in greater efficiency and time saving, while cultural creativity 
allows people to have improved experiences in their own time. Furthermore, in 
integrating ‘cultural development’ into the argument, Li is agreeing in principle with 
Wang that the fundamental goal of creative industries is not creating wealth and jobs, 
but points out that value is manifest in how they improve and renew society. 
 
An important ingredient in the Shanghai approach is the concept of a creative 
community, an idea borrowed from John Eger (2003). Here again, the idea is 
potentially destabilising to the mainstream political view of the Chinese population as 
‘the masses’ or ‘the people’. Li says the creative industries have the capacity to foster 
creative communities, which will enhance social harmony. In the context of Hu 
Jintao’s ‘harmonious society’ these will have positive benefits for overall social and 
economic development. In a revision of conventional investment seeking policies, Li 
argues that the secret to success for 21st century cities is no longer limited to 
attracting foreign enterprises and capital through favourable policies, or constructing 
large-scale industrial precincts, or even promoting science and technology. The 
answer lies in the diversion of attention from the material to ‘the people’; that is, the 
construction of a creative community. 
 
What a creative community actually entails in terms of greater openness, however, 
remains to be seen. Certainly, the work of Li Wuwei is not averse to citing Richard 
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 Florida, which brings the focus back to the creative class, a concept that has hitherto 
lacked official support in China. Li argues, ‘Creativity demonstrates the power of 
ideas. Creative industries have become a new form of urban economy; they are a 
fertilizer of urban vitality and dynamics and a source of strength for urban 
development. It can bring about huge economic and social benefits for cities’ (Li 2008: 
14). 
 
The entry of business entrepreneurs into creative endeavours is also strengthening the 
power of ideas in China. At the same time the influence of cultural officials in the 
realm of event planning may be diminishing. A CEO keynote speaker at the Shanghai 
Creative Industries Week in 2008 expressed the following view: ‘We believe that the 
development of creative industries is about the innovation in thought; this entails 
further liberation of thought, along with the discipline of the market and the 
realization that this a transformational economic development model’ (Wang 2008). 
In this presentation there is a significant shift from the rigidity of official Newspeak 
whilst paying lip-service to Deng Xiaoping’s 1978 dictum ‘the liberation of thought’.  
 
Another perspective comes from Shao Longtu from the Shanghai Design Centre, who 
cites the challenge of balancing collective and individual approaches to intellectual 
property protection. Too often in China, he believes, the individual is subsumed 
within the collective and not allowed to recoup the benefits of his or her creativity 
(Shao 2008).  As mentioned earlier, the dominant Beijing view is that the cultural 
industries are about generating enterprises that have ‘autonomous innovation’ 
potential and which will generate collective intellectual property. While both these 
camps agree with the importance of intellectual property protection and the 
crackdown on illegal cultural products, it remains to be seen which approach, 
individual or collective, will provide the creative ecology to enable China to actually 




Concluding remarks: from the tangible to the intangible 
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 In this article I have proposed four ways of thinking about the reception and impact of 
the creative industries in China. Introduced into China in 2004, the concept met with 
resistance from central government power bases while engendering support amongst 
growth coalitions. Despite a history of Sinicizing foreign ideas, often noted by adding 
the phrase ‘with Chinese characteristics’, the idea of creative industries might be 
viewed as somewhat incongruous in a culture which has for more than two thousand 
years advised people to follow the prescriptions of sages, worthies—and in the case of 
Chinese Communist Party Chairman Mao Zedong, charismatic leaders. The 
Confucian view, although modified over history, was that a sage does not create, but 
merely transmits (Makeham 2003). The education system in China has followed, and 
continues to follow this pattern. However, while the idea that creativity has its natural 
home in the West is contested, there is a move within some intellectual and business 
circles to make China more innovative and creative; this has in turn provided an 
ideological buffer for the creative industries.   
 
Proposition two recognises the persuasive effect of creative industries on members of 
the business and intellectual community. In some ways this recognition is reminiscent 
of the May Fourth Period in China (1915 – 1925) when literary societies such as the 
Creation Society (chuangzao she) emerged, advocating a fusion of Chinese art and 
culture with Western romanticism. By the end of this decade the ground had shifted 
and Western-influenced writers were ostracized by China’s left-wing cultural policy 
cadres. The policy response of today is less stark, given the buy-in of the creative 
industries by municipal and local governments. Significantly however, the Beijing 
‘national school’ has attempted to maintain the political high ground of cultural 
industries and ‘cultural development’ while evoking ‘autonomous innovation’ by and 
for ‘the people’. In this model the emphasis falls on traditional culture. Moreover, the 
national remit of the cultural industries, as opposed to the city-based appeal of the 
creative industries, produces a more seamless ideological fit with ‘harmonious 
society’, the Chinese Communist Party’s vision of a more egalitarian society 
extending beyond the large urban centres into the Western regions. In this version of 
economic development theme parks, cultural sites, guided tourism and artefacts, often 
mass produced, provide employment for ordinary Chinese and new income for 
regions struggling to shift from manufacturing to services.     
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 The third version is the most pragmatic; it accepts whatever version of ‘cultural’ or 
‘creative industries’ works, while maintaining a role for government as the architect 
of transformation. The conversion of residential and factory space into clusters, with 
the assistance of officials, however, means that there is a need to show return on 
investment. The emphasis falls on activities that generate visible returns, attract 
tourists and cause minimal disruption. It is probably the model most likely to succeed 
in the current climate. This model is also stimulated by a flow of scholar-consultants 
and practitioners from northern Europe, most of who are ‘literate’ in the language of 
the creative industries and willing to engage in co-productions, partnerships and joint 
ventures. Again, the language used here is pragmatic: cultural, creative or cultural 
creative.   
 
The final version is to some extent utopian. One way of reading this change concerns 
a move to greater openness, an embrace of creative communities, and 
internationalisation. However, the discursive field maintains key elements of cultural 
policy discourse, particularly the emphasis on ‘cultural soft power’. It notes the 
continuity of traditional culture but more importantly focuses on China’s creative 
development in the following terms: ‘the creation of an unprecedented, brand new, 
modern and fashionable cultural and creative brand’ (Li 2008).  
 
One of the themes of Creative Industries Are Changing China is that of a major 
turning point. Recalling China’s WTO accession, one might anticipate the potential of 
another institutional ‘wrecking ball’. However, Li Wuwei is a modern day reformer, 
ideologically removed from hardline Ministry of Culture positions. But he is still 
pragmatic. The claim that the creative industries are changing China will need to be 
tested over time. Moreover, such change is incremental. As China’s great reformer-
scholar Hu Shi (1891 – 1962) proclaimed during the May Fourth Period in his seminal 
essay ‘The meaning of the new trend in thought’: 
 
Civilization is not created in a vague and general fashion, it is created bit by 
bit and drop by drop. Progress in not achieved in an evening, in a vague and 
general fashion, it is achieved bit by bit and drop by drop…’ (cited in Wang 
1995, p. 53).    
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 The creative industries discourse in China should not be evaluated through the same 
ideological lenses as in the West where creative expression is a given. Nonetheless, its 
uptake is shaped by Western influences. Many of the scholar-consultants who advise 
propaganda officials in municipal and local governments present a case for creative 
communities, greater tolerance and more business transparency. These arguments 
about tolerance and transparency are more difficult to prosecute to the supporters of 
the cultural industries in Beijing, where proximity to Tiananmen conjures up 
memories of Western-influenced democracy supporters. In effect, the Western 
discourse of creativity is central to the ‘creative industries package’ in China.  
 
However, whatever positive benefits result from debates about creative industries in 
China—and here I am referring specifically to a greater emphasis on the shift from 
low-cost manufacturing towards higher value services, the gradual opening of 
Chinese society to a more plural communicative ethos, the emergence of independent 
production sectors in film, television and animation, and the transformation of 
imitative practices towards producing original ideas—there are a range of negative 
externalities. As Yúdice (2003) has noted, the creative economy serves the interests of 
managerial classes, entertainment conglomerates, real estate developers, and the 
holders of intellectual property more than the subordinate classes of civil society. One 
might expect that the current fashion with the creative industries, particularly within 
policy and business circles, to diminish if (and when) returns on investment fail to 
match expectations. One might also expect support for creative industries from those 
currently disillusioned with the rhetoric of national cultural policy to evaporate if the 
creative industries idea becomes the handmaiden of developers and entrepreneurs. 
The same caveat applies if the ‘creative industries’ becomes a national political slogan. 
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i The Chinese word that expressed the idea ‘to create’ in the ancient texts was zuo: literally meaning ‘to 
make’ or ‘to cultivate’. In modern Chinese the word ‘to create’ is chuang which is used as a verb in 
association with the morphemes zuo (to make) and zao (to make). As a noun it is necessary to introduce 
the idea of applying some action or force (li): creativity is therefore chuangzaoli. The contemporary 
adjectival usage of chuangyi found in the expression creative industries is a neologism; chuangyi is 
rarely found in dictionaries. In the comprehensive New Age Chinese English Dictionary published by 
The Commercial Press in 2000, chuangyi expresses the idea ‘to create a new concept of art; to break 
fresh ground in imaginative art’ (p. 237)   
ii The ‘Zhonggong zhongyang guanyu shiwu guihua de jianyi’ advocated ‘perfecting cultural industries 
policy, strengthening the establishment and regulation of the cultural market and promoting the 
development of cultural industries’ (Zhang at al 2004: 2)    
iii The Document was called The Statistical Classifications of Cultural and Associated Industries 
(wenhua ji xianguan tongji fenlei). 
iv Literally ‘cultural construction.’ 
v This dilemma is illustrated by the formation of the International Creative Industries Alliance (ICIA) 
in Beijing in December 2007, funded by the Gehua Cultural Development Group, a major state-owned 
enterprise. In spite of having a new purpose built centre, the Beijing Creativity Centre (see Keane 
2007), by the end of 2008, the centre remained virtually vacant as Gehua management reconsidered its 
strategic development.   
vi In the Development Report of the Creative Industries in China 2007 by Zhang et al (2008) 
Recreation and entertainment includes: mass cultural activities, sports organization, gymnasiums and 
stadiums and other sports, indoor recreation, amusement parks, body-building recreation, other 
recreation; travel agencies, the scenic spots management, parks management, other excursion districts 
management, p. 27 English version. 
vii Conversation with Dongcheng District cultural official, Communication University of China, Oct 5, 
2008. 
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